Abstract. This paper demonstrates the potential of veri cation based on state spaces reduced by equivalence relations. The basic observation is that quite often, some states of a system are similar, i.e., they induce similar behaviours. Similarity can be formally expressed by de ning equivalence relations on the set of states and the set of actions of a system under consideration. A state space can be constructed, in which the nodes correspond to equivalence classes of states and the arcs correspond to equivalence classes of actions. Such a state space is often much smaller than the ordinary full state space, but does allow derivation of many veri cation results. Other researchers have taken advantage of the symmetries of systems, which induce a certain kind of equivalence. The contribution of this paper is to show that a more general notion of equivalence is useful. As example, a communication protocol modelled in the formalism of Coloured Petri Nets is veri ed. Aided by a computer tool supporting state spaces with equivalence classes, signi cant reductions of state spaces are exhibited.
Introduction
In the research of veri cation of parallel and distributed systems, some attention has been given to take advantage of symmetry to alleviate the state explosion problem 2]. Symmetry appears when a system is composed of similar components, whose identities are immaterial with respect to state space veri cation. As an example, consider the well-known dining philosophers system. A state of this system in which philosophers 1 and 3 are eating, is symmetric to a state in which philosophers 3 and 5 are eating. The rst state can be mapped to the second by the permutation which rotates philosopher i into philosopher i + 2 (modulo the number of philosophers). Symmetry is also present in many real-world systems.
In 8], state spaces with equivalence classes (SSEs) are presented under the name OE-graphs as a theoretical generalisation of state spaces based on symmetries. The author of 8] notes that the experiences with practical use of SSEs are rather limited, and the examples given are all equivalences de ned using only the structure of the systems under consideration. In particular, symmetry is a structural, statical notion, based on permutation of similar components. The contribution of this paper is to recognise that sometimes, a more dynamic kind of equivalence is needed, and to demonstrate that SSEs are applicable for this purpose. SSEs are described and de ned for the formalism of Coloured Petri Nets, but the idea generalises immediately to formalisms allowing an explicit representation of both states and actions of systems.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the communication protocol to be used as example and the properties that we are going to verify. Moreover, Sect. 2 informally outlines the formalism of Coloured Petri Nets. Section 3 presents the concept of SSEs and shows how to de ne appropriate equivalence relations on the states and actions of the considered example. In Sect. 4, the example is veri ed: It is rst proved that the equivalence relations are consistent (well-de ned), ensuring that the SSEs can actually be used to derive the desired veri cation results. Then it is described how the veri cation was carried out. Finally, statistics are presented to compare veri cation based on SSEs and based on ordinary full state spaces. Section 5 draws the conclusions including a discussion of related work.
An Example | The Transport Protocol
In this section, we present a protocol from the transport layer of the OSI reference model, the transport protocol. The system consists of a sender, which wants to transfer some data to a receiver. Communication takes place on an unreliable network, with risk of loss and overtaking. The data is a text string, split into substrings of length eight, and each assigned a sequence number. A pair consisting of a sequence number and a string is called a data packet. Data packets must be received in the right order. Whenever a data packet is received, an acknowledgement is sent. The protocol is a stop-and-wait protocol: The sender keeps sending copies of the data packet that the receiver expects, until the sender gets a proper acknowledgement from the receiver. Then, the sender starts sending the next data packet. The term packet is used generically for both data packets and acknowledgements.
The model of the transport protocol, shown in Fig. 1 , is created in the formalism of Coloured Petri Nets (CP-nets) 5, 7] which is a graphical language for design, speci cation, validation, and veri cation of parallel and distributed systems. CP-nets belong to the class of High-level Petri Nets, a generalisation of ordinary Petri Nets, allowing succinct descriptions of models. The model in Fig. 1 is created with the Design/CPN tool 6, 7] , which supports CP-nets. The tool support for veri cation based on SSEs 9], which is used in this paper, is an integrated part of Design/CPN.
Below, we give a brief, informal description of CP-nets, su cient to understand the model of the transport protocol and subsequently the idea of SSEs.
In Fig. 1 , the state of the sender is modelled by the two ellipse-shaped places Send and NextSend. Send contains all data packets, and NextSend contains the number of the next data packet to be sent. The state of the receiver is, in a similar way, modelled by the two places Received and NextRec. Received contains the data received until now, and NextRec contains the number of the next data packet expected. The state of the network is modelled by the circular network places, A and B which may contain data packets, and C and D which may contain acknowledgements. The place Limit is used to model that the network has a certain capacity, i.e., that the network can maximally contain a certain number of packets at a time. A place has a marking describing its contents. A state of a CP-net is a function which maps each place to its marking. The marking of a place is a multi-set 1 , i.e., it may contain more copies of the same token. The tokens carry data values (called colours), and each place is assigned a type (colour set) which determines the kind of tokens which the place may contain. The type of a place is written in italics close to the place. E.g., the place Send has the type INTxDATA, which in the declaration box shown at the bottom of Fig. 1 , is de ned as a (Cartesian) product, where the rst component is of type INT (an integer) and the second component is of type DATA (a string). A data packet is represented as a token of type INTxDATA. The initial state of the CP-net is determined by the initial markings of the places, which are written close to the places (and omitted when empty). E.g., Send initially contains all data packets, all four network places are empty, and Received contains the empty string (""). Multi-sets are functions from their domains into the set of natural numbers. A multiset ms over a domain X is written as a formal sum like P x2X ms(x) 0 x. empty denotes the empty multi-set.
In Fig. 1 , the actions of the sender correspond to the two box-shaped transitions SendData and RecAck. SendData models sending of data packets and RecAck models reception of acknowledgements. The receiver only has one action, corresponding to the transition RecData which models reception of data packets and sending of acknowledgements. The actions of the network correspond to the two transitions TransData and TransAck modelling transfer of packets.
Transitions and places are connected by arcs. The behaviour of a CP-net consists of transitions removing tokens from the places connected by incoming arcs (input places) and adding tokens to the places connected by outgoing arcs (output places). The tokens removed and added are determined by arc expressions, which are positioned next to the arcs. A transition that is ready to remove and add tokens is said to be enabled and may occur. The conditions on a transition to be enabled is that appropriate tokens are present on the input places. More precisely, it must be possible to bind data values to the variables appearing on input arcs such that the arc expressions evaluate to tokens available on the input places. The condition on enabling of, e.g., SendData, is that it is possible to bind the variables n and d such that the place Send contains a data packet (n,d) and the integer n is on the NextSend place. Moreover, there must be an e token on the Limit place. A binding element is a pair consisting of a transition and a binding of data values to its variables. In the initial state, the binding element (SendData,<n=1,d="CAV-1997">) is enabled. An occurrence of the transition SendData models sending of a data packet. Because a double arc is a shorthand for two arcs, one arc in each direction with the same arc expression, the net e ect of an occurrence of this binding element is that an e token is removed from the place Limit and a (1,"CAV-1997") token is added to the A place.
The possibility of losing packets on the network is modelled using the boolean variable success. In occurrences of the transitions TransData and TransAck, success can be bound to either true or false. The former case corresponds to successful transmission, the latter to loss of a packet.
In a given state M, the marking of a place p is denoted M(p). M 
State Spaces with Equivalence Classes
An ordinary state space (SSO) for a CP-net is a directed graph with a node for each reachable state and arcs corresponding to occurring binding elements. The source of an arc is the state in which the associated binding element occurs, and the destination is the state resulting from the occurrence.
The de nition of a state space with equivalence classes (SSE) for a CP-net requires that an equivalence speci cation is given. An equivalence speci cation consists of two equivalence relations | one on the set of states and one on the set of binding elements. The equivalence relations must capture an equivalence actually present in the considered system. This means that two equivalent reachable states must induce similar behaviours. This requirement is referred to as consistency, and resembles strong bisimulation in the process algebra CCS 10] . Consistency is formalised in Def. 1 below, which is equivalent to Def. 2.2. in 8].
For two states or two binding elements x and y, if x is equivalent to y, we write x y, and the equivalence class of x is written x]. For a set X, X] denotes the set of elements equivalent with some element in X.
De nition 1. Let . Given a consistent equivalence speci cation, the SSE has a node for each equivalence class containing a reachable state. Moreover, the SSE has an arc between two nodes if and only if there is a state in the equivalence class of the source node in which a binding element is enabled and leads to a state in the equivalence class of the destination node. There is exactly one arc for each equivalence class of binding elements with this property. This is formalised in Def. 2 below, which, disregarding di erences in terminology, is identical to Def. Items 1 and 2 de ne the sets of nodes and arcs, respectively. Item 3 de nes a function which for each arc designates its source and destination. Item 3 is necessary to allow multiple arcs between two nodes which may appear in SSEs.
An SSE is often much smaller than the corresponding SSO, of course depending on the equivalence speci cation, and can be computed on-the-y, i.e., without rst constructing the SSO. When the SSE is nite, it can be used directly to prove many dynamic properties of the CP-net. In this paper, we will not discuss these properties exhaustively, but just note that the ones to be used for veri cation of the transport protocol can be proved from the SSE. For more details, the reader is encouraged to consult 8].
The equivalence speci cation for the transport protocol is dynamic, and based on the observation that certain packets on the network may become similar as the system executes. Suppose that the receiver expects data packet number three next. Arrival of any data packet with a number less than three does not change the state of the receiver. Such a data packet on the network will be called old. Arrival of any old data packet has the e ect that an acknowledgement asking for data packet number three is sent. Thus two old data packets arriving at the receiver have exactly the same e ect. Similar observations and terminology apply to acknowledgements arriving at the sender. The purpose of the equivalence speci cation is to capture that old data packets and old acknowledgements, respectively, are equivalent. The equivalence speci cation will be explained and de ned below. ((M(p))(n; d)) 0 (n; d): (1) A similar function, also called old, coping with old acknowledgements on the places p 2 fC; Dg is used, where the condition n < M(NextRec) in (1) is replaced by n M(NextSend). Now the de nition: M 1 M 2 , (jM 1 (NextSend)j = jM 2 (NextSend)j = jM 1 (NextRec)j = jM 2 (NextRec)j = 1)( 8p 2 fSend; NextSend; Limit; Received; NextRecg : M 1 (p) = M 2 (p))( 8p 2 fA; B; C; Dg :
We now consider the equivalence relation on the set of binding elements. A problem to solve rst is that the transition TransData (see Fig. 1 ) cannot tell whether a data packet that it is going to transmit is old or not. It only knows the binding of its variables. Whether a data packet is old or not depends on the marking of the place 
Veri cation of the Transport Protocol
In this section, we describe veri cation of the transport protocol. First, we prove that the equivalence speci cation de ned above is consistent. Then, we translate the properties listed at the end of Sect. 2 into dynamic properties of the CP-net, and outline how these properties can be proved from the SSE. Finally, we present statistics to compare the veri cation based on SSEs and SSOs for di erent values of the system parameter L. L is the capacity of the network as determined by the number of e tokens on the Limit place in the initial state. We rst prove that the equivalence speci cation de ned in Sect. 3 is consistent according to Def. We do so by a case analysis on the transition of b. In this paper, we only sketch the proof, and we only consider one of the ve transitions, namely TransData.
We split the proof into four cases according to whether b corresponds to an old data packet or not, and whether b corresponds to a loss or not. For p 2 fA; Bg; i 2 f1; 2g, let young(M i (p)) be the marking of p in M i in which all old data packets are removed from p. Let us now consider the three properties listed at the end of Sect. 2 which we want to verify for the protocol. We want to translate them into appropriate dynamic properties of the CP-net, which are formally de ned in 7], and informally described in the following. For No improper terminal state, we need the concept of a dead state, which is a state in which no binding element is enabled. The No improper terminal state property is established if we can verify that in all dead states of the CP-net, all data packets have been properly received. For Possibility of termination, we need the concept of a home space, which is a set of states with the property that from any reachable state, it is possible to reach a state of the home space. The Possibility of termination property is established if we can verify that there exists a home space containing only dead states. For Eventual termination, we need the concept of a set of binding elements being impartial, meaning that elements from the set occur in nitely often in any innite sequence of occurrences. The Eventual termination property is established if we can prove that the set of binding elements corresponding to loss of packets is impartial.
The proof rules for SSEs (OE-graphs) in 8] and their implementation as query functions 9], allowed us to verify the protocol. It turned out that for each investigated value of the system parameter L, the generated SSE had exactly one terminal node. The corresponding equivalence class had only one member, namely the state in which all data packets had been properly received, and all four network places were empty. This equivalence class was a home space, thus the only terminal state was a home state. It can be seen that SSEs yielded remarkable reductions in the numbers of nodes and arcs, and that SSEs enabled us to analyse capacities of the network that we could not handle using SSOs. Moreover, from a certain point, generation of the SSE was faster than generation of the SSO. The query time, i.e., the actual veri cation of the three considered properties of the transport protocol, was, again from a certain point, much faster on the SSE than on the SSO. This is because the queries were made directly on the SSE, and the size of the graph is the critical factor in the time complexity.
Conclusions
The motivation to write this paper came from our work with developing tool support for SSEs 9] . Our prime focus was on state spaces with symmetries (OSgraphs with permutations for CP-nets as de ned in 8]), because their usefulness was already recognised. The recent journal 2] contains four papers 1,3{5] that all demonstrate the potential of using symmetry in state space veri cation. A common denominator for the four papers is that symmetry is conceived as a structural property, described by permutations of similar components.
The generality of SSEs allowed us to experiment with di erent kinds of equivalence relations. During these experiments, we realised the usefulness of SSEs, not based on permutations. In this paper, we saw that SSEs allow equivalences that are dynamic, in the sense that they express that some information becomes irrelevant as the execution of a system progresses. An interesting question is of course, whether the results presented generalise, i.e., apply to other systems. We believe they do. We believe that the notion of old of the example can be found in various disguises in many systems.
State space veri cation methods are often touted as being automatic and thus quite reliable. For veri cation based on SSEs, a quali cation must be made: Proving the consistency of a proposed equivalence speci cation may, as seen in this paper, be a non-trivial task. A manual mathematical proof had to be conducted, with the risk of making mistakes. In state spaces with symmetries (OS-graphs with permutations of 8]), proving consistency of a proposed speci cation can be done by a trivial analysis of all static inscriptions of the CP-net. No ingenuity is required, and the proof can be highly computer-aided. Also, in the approaches to symmetry of 1, 3] , it is the responsibility of the user to de ne the symmetries of the system and ensure their consistency. In contrast, 4] presents a procedure which automatically detects the symmetries of a system. The basic idea is to impose narrow syntactical restrictions on the modelling language ensuring that non-symmetry is not expressible.
The complexity of the consistency proof is a drawback of veri cation based on SSEs. However, the con dence in the consistency of an equivalence speci cation can be highly increased with the aid of the tool supporting SSEs as described in 8]. In conclusion, we do believe that the observations made and the reductions exhibited in this paper are very encouraging for veri cation based on SSEs.
